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each other in terms of marginal income taxation. In addition, the appearance of
equilibrium unemployment provides an incentive for the government to directly tax
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11.    Introduction
During the latest decades, outsourcing has become an increasingly important aspect
of production. Outsourcing means that part of the production activity is located to another
country. Large wage differences across countries is most likely an important explanation
for this behavior, as the production costs may be substantially reduced if part of the
production is located to a country with lower wages1. Although earlier research has
addressed some implications of outsourcing for unemployment and welfare policy2, very
little research has so far been devoted to the implications of outsourcing for optimal
redistributive taxation. An exception is the recent study by Aronsson and Koskela (2008),
who incorporate outsourcing in an optimal income tax model with two ability-types and
perfectly competitive markets. Their results show that if the government is able to control
the amount of resources spent on outsourcing via a direct tax instrument (e.g. a payment
made by firms per unit of resources transferred abroad), then outsourcing will not modify
the optimal use of income taxation, i.e. the marginal income tax structure is governed by
the same incentives as in the absence of outsourcing. However, if the government lacks a
direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, then outsourcing contributes to reduce the
marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type and increase the marginal
income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type, which means that outsourcing
contributes to a more progressive tax structure. The intuition is that increased labor tax
progression leads to less outsourcing3, implying that increased tax progression also serves
as an indirect instrument to reduce the wage inequality.
The main purpose of the present paper is to analyze outsourcing and redistributive
nonlinear taxation in an economy with involuntary unemployment. Such a study is
important for at least two reasons. First, many western countries have been characterized
by relatively high unemployment rates during long time-periods, especially among low-
skilled labor, while at the same time part of the previously domestic production activities
have been moved abroad to a greater extent than before (see e.g. Stefanova 2006 for the
1  For a wide range of industries, wage differences across countries constitute central explanations for
outsourcing of production; see e.g. Amiti and Wei (2004), Rishi and Saxena (2004) and Sinn (2007).
2     See e.g. Keuschnigg and Ribi (2007).
2East-West dichotomy of outsourcing). Therefore, if outsourcing leads to reduced demand
for low-skilled labor, this suggests that the policy implications of outsourcing and
involuntary unemployment ought to be analyzed simultaneously. Second, although earlier
literature show that both outsourcing and involuntary unemployment imply restraint on
redistributive policy, there have been no attempts so far to combine them in the study of
redistributive nonlinear taxation. Another purpose of the paper is to extend the set of policy
instruments by also considering provision of a public input good. The basic idea is that
public input goods, which enhance the productivity of domestic labor, can be used to
(partly) offset the increased inequality4 and unemployment that would otherwise be a
consequence of outsourcing. Therefore, the appearances of outsourcing and unemployment
(two phenomenon that predominantly affect the choice sets of low-skilled workers) may
constitute two interrelated arguments for public policy, whose simultaneous effects have
been neglected in earlier literature on redistributive taxation and public goods.
The present paper is also related to a relatively small – yet growing – literature
dealing with optimal nonlinear taxation in economies with imperfect competition in the
labor market. 5 To our knowledge, Marceau and Boadway (1994) wrote the first paper in
this area. Their study is based on an extension of the two-type model developed by Stern
(1982) and Stiglitz (1982), and it focuses on the welfare effects of minimum wages and
unemployment insurance. Boadway and Cuff (2001) also address the redistributive role of
minimum wages; yet from a broader perspective as they consider the effects of minimum
wage legislation in combination with either linear or nonlinear income taxation as well as
distinguish between fixed and flexible labor supply among the employed. Aronsson and
Sjögren (2003) analyze a mixed tax problem in combination with provision of a public
consumption good in a two-type model with union wage formation. They show (among
other things) how employment-related motives behind the public policy, which are due to
the appearance of imperfect competition in the labor market, modify the use of income
3    This is a consequence of their empirically reasonable assumption that outsourcing is complementary with
skilled labor and substitutable for unskilled labor.
4  Earlier literature often emphasizes that outsourcing tends to increase the wage differentials between
skilled and unskilled labor; see also section 2 below.
5  See also the related literature dealing with optimal linear taxation in economies with involuntary
unemployment, e.g. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996), Boeters and Schneider (1999) and Koskela and
Schöb (2002).
3taxation, commodity taxation and public good provision by comparison with the use of
these instruments in a competitive economy.6 Aronsson et al. (in press) extend the analysis
to a dynamic economy and show that unemployment gives rise to intertemporal production
inefficiency at the second best optimum which constitutes an employment-related
argument for using capital income taxation.
Following Marceau and Boadway (1994), our study is based on a two-type optimal
income tax model with a minimum wage implemented for the low-ability type which, in
turn, gives rise to unemployment at the equilibrium. A minimum wage approach to
imperfect competition in the labor market is clearly relevant from a practical policy
perspective, as many countries implement minimum wages at present. Only in Europe,
there is a variety of minimum wage systems, where a formal distinction is made between
systems where the minimum wage is decided upon by the government (i.e. via legislation),
and systems where the minimum wage is the outcome of bargaining between the
employers and representatives of the employees.7 A minimum wage model has also
theoretical appeal, as it provides a simpler and more tractable alternative to models with
trade-unionized labor markets often applied in earlier literature on optimal taxation under
imperfect competition in the labor market.8
In a way similar to Aronsson and Koskela (2008), we distinguish between (i) a
situation where the government can control the resources spent on outsourcing via a direct
tax; and (ii) a situation where this direct tax instrument for controlling outsourcing is not
available. This distinction is reasonable: whereas the former case is appealing from a
welfare economic point of view (as we are dealing with normative aspects of taxation), the
argument behind latter case is more practical because international agreements on factor
6  See also the related literature dealing with labor income tax progression; for instance, by considering the
relationship between, on the one hand, the optimal degree of tax progression and, on the other, the
structure of wage bargaining and/or the incentives characterizing the choice of work hours (Fuest and
Huber 1997 and Aronsson and Sjögren 2004a, 2004b).
7  See Dolado et al. (1996) for a comparative empirical study of the consequences for employment of using
minimum wages. The empirical evidence is mixed, and no strong evidence of adverse effects on
employment is found except possibly for young workers.
8  Real world labor markets may contain a variety of mechanisms - such as minimum wage legislation,
wage bargaining between trade-unions and firms and wage-induced productivity (i.e. the idea underlying
efficiency wages) – that give rise to involuntary unemployment. From our perspective, and except for the
tractability-argument presented above, it does not matter so much which mechanism is chosen, since they
all imply similar employment-related incentives for tax and expenditure policies.
4mobility and trade may limit the availability of such instruments in practice. However, by
contrast to Aronsson and Koskela, who analyze an economy with perfect competition, the
distinction between Cases (i) and (ii) above is also relevant in the sense of highlighting an
employment-related motive behind taxes on outsourcing.
The outline of the study is as follows. In section 2, we describe the decision-
problems facing private agents, i.e. consumers and firms, and the outcome of private
optimization. We also describe the labor market (with a minimum wage imposed on the
low-ability type) as the outcome in terms of employment. Section 3 concerns the optimal
tax and expenditure problem in Case (i), where the government has access to a tax on
outsourcing. The results show that redistributive and employment-related motives for
taxation in general work in the same direction: the government implements a positive
marginal labor tax rate for the low-ability type, a negative marginal income tax rate for the
high-ability type and a positive tax on outsourcing, respectively, and these tendencies are
strengthened by the appearance of equilibrium unemployment. For the public input good,
however, the redistributive argument (relaxation of the self-selection constraint) and the
employment-related motive work in opposite directions. We find that the desire to increase
employment leads to overprovision of the public input good relative to the first best policy
rule. In section 4, we analyze optimal income taxation and public provision in Case (ii),
where the government lacks a direct tax instrument attached to outsourcing. Our results
here show that the use of income taxation as an indirect instrument to affect outsourcing
does not affect the incentives underlying the marginal income tax rate implemented for the
low-ability type, while it may change the marginal income tax implemented for the high-
ability type in either direction (although the additional component in the tax formula is
easy to understand and interpret). In addition, the public input good will, in this case, partly
serve as an indirect instrument to reduce outsourcing; the latter provides an incentive to
increase public provision. The results are summarized and discussed in section 5.
2.     The Model
In this section, we present the decision-problems facing private agents, i.e.
consumers and firms, and continue by characterizing the labor market as well as the
5outcome of private optimization. The decision-problem facing the government and the
outcome in terms of optimal taxation and provision of the public input good are addressed
sections 3 (for Case (i)) and 4 (for Case (ii)).
2.1. Consumers
There are two types of consumers; a low-ability type (denoted by superindex 1) and a
high-ability type (denoted by superindex 2). The distinction between ability-types refers to
productivity, which is interpreted to mean that the high-ability type faces a higher before
tax wage rate than the low-ability type. We denote the number of individuals of each
ability-type by 1n  and 2n , respectively.
The utility function facing ability-type i (i=1,2) is given by
( , )i i iu u c z?            (1)
where c is consumption and z leisure. Leisure is, in turn, defined as a time endowment, H,
less the time spent in market work, l. Let iw  denote the hourly gross wage rate and )( iilwT
the income tax payment by ability-type i. The individual budget constraint can then be
written as
( ) 0i i i i iw l T w l c? ? ? .            (2)
The first order condition for the hours of work becomes
(1 '( )) 0i i i i ic zu w T w l u? ? ?            (3)
where '( ) ( ) / ( )i i i i i iT w l T w l w l? ? ?  is the marginal income tax rate.
As indicated above, some low-ability agents may become unemployed due to the
minimum wage policy (see below). Each unemployed individual is assumed to receive an
6unemployment benefit, b , and consume the maximum amount of leisure. Therefore, the
utility facing an unemployed individual becomes ( , )uu u b H? .
2.2. Production
Turning to the production side of the economy, we assume that the representative
firm uses three variable inputs – domestic labor of each ability-type and the amount of
resources outsourced to production abroad - together with a public input good (which
appears as an externality production factor) to produce a homogenous good. The
production function is characterized by decreasing returns to scale in the three production
factors controlled by the firm.9 The production function is written as 1 2( , , , )F L L M G ,
where iL  represents the total number of hours of work by ability-type i, measured as the
hours of work per employee times the number of employed persons, whereas M denotes
the resources spent on outsourcing and G represents the public input good.
Skilled and unskilled labor are assumed to be technical complements in production,
i.e. 1 2 1 2( , , , ) 0L LF L L M G ? . Following Koskela and Stenbacka (2007), we also assume that
outsourcing is substitutable for unskilled labor and complementary with skilled labor;
therefore, 1 1 2( , , , ) 0L MF L L M G ?  and 2
1 2( , , , ) 0
L M
F L L M G ? , which means that outsourcing
leads to wage inequality (as long as the before tax wage rates are determined by marginal
productivity).10 In a study dealing with the effects of globalization on the skill premium,
Ethier (2005) uses a similar type of production function to analyze the decision between
international outsourcing and in-house production. We assume that while some activities
are easy to outsource, other activities are more costly to outsource. Therefore, the marginal
cost of outsourcing increases in the scope of activities to outsource, so that there is a cost
of outsourcing, ( )M? , which is increasing and strictly convex, i.e. 0)('',0)(' ?? MM ?? .
This captures the idea that outsourcing may necessitate costly investments into the
9   Lommerud et al. (2006) have demonstrated how international mergers might curb the market power of
unions giving socially excessive incentives for international mergers, unless products are close
substitutes. In this paper we do not focus on the simultaneous presence of imperfections in labor and
product markets.
10  Empirical support for the idea that outsourcing leads to more inequality are provided from different
countries e.g. by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005), Hijzen (2007), Egger and
Egger (2006),  Munch and Skaksen (2005), Riley and Young (2007) and Geishecker and Görg (2008).
7establishment of network of suppliers in relevant host-countries. The public input good
will be assumed to increase the marginal productivity of both skilled and unskilled labor,
which means 1 1 2( , , , ) 0L GF L L M G ?  and 2
1 2( , , , ) 0
L G
F L L M G ? , whereas outsourcing and the
public input good are weak substitutes in the sense that 1 2( , , , ) 0MGF L L M G ? .
11
The objective function facing the firm can be written as
tMMLwLwGMLLF ????? )(),,,( 2211,21 ??
where t is the tax per unit of the resources spent on outsourcing (which may, or may not, be
operative). The first order conditions become
1
1 2 1( , , , ) 0LF L L M G w? ?            (4)
2
1 2 2( , , , ) 0LF L L M G w? ?            (5)
1 2( , , , ) ( ) 0M MF L L M G M t?? ? ? .            (6)
As mentioned in the introduction, we consider two possible cases with regards to the tax on
outsourcing; Case (i) means that this tax is operative, i.e. part of the set of tax instruments
facing the government (section 3), whereas Case (ii) means that it is not operative and,
therefore, set equal to zero (section 4).
2.3. The Labor Market
As we indicated above, the labor market for high-skilled labor is assumed to be
competitive, meaning that the equilibrium condition becomes 2 2 2L n l? . Low-skilled
11  In real world economies, outsourcing often means that firms move part of their production structure and
employ (primarily low-skilled) labor abroad. Therefore, if domestic public input goods contribute to
increase the productivity of domestic production factors, increased public provision means, ceteris
paribus, a stronger incentive for domestic production relative to outsourcing. Our assumption that
outsourcing and the public input good are weak substitutes can be thought of as a ‘reduced form
equivalent’ to this property. However, note also that all results derived below would still apply if
outsourcing and the public input goods are complements in the production function, provided that the
degree of complementary is low relative to the degree of complementary between the public input good
and domestic labor.
8workers, on the other hand, are subject to a minimum wage, i.e. 1minw , which is decided
upon by the government. The minimum wage is assumed to imply a binding constraint in
what follows, so 1 1minw w? .
To be able to derive expressions for the marginal income tax rates comparable to
those derived in earlier studies on optimal redistributive income taxation under imperfect
competition in the labor market, let us rewrite equation (4) such that
1
1 1 2 2 1
min( , , , ) 0LF n l n l M G w? ?                                (7)
where 1n  is interpretable as the number of employed low-skilled individuals. As the
binding minimum wage exceeds the market clearing wage rate, it follows that the low-
skilled are partly unemployed, i.e. 1 1n n? . We can then use equation (7) to solve for the
number of employed individuals of the low-ability type as a function of variables that the
government controls via its tax and expenditure policies as follows
1 1 1 2 1
max( , , , , )n n l l M G w
? ? ?? ?
? .                                (8)
In equation (8), the constant 2n  has been suppressed for notational convenience, and the
sign above each argument indicates the comparative statics effect. With the assumptions
made above, therefore, an increase in the hours of work per employed individual of the
low-ability type, the resources spent on outsourcing and the minimum wage, respectively,
tend to decrease the number of employed low-ability agents, whereas increases in the hours
of work per high-ability agent and the public input have the opposite effect.
3.   Optimal Taxation and Public Provision in Case (i)
In this section, we analyze the optimal use of income taxation, taxation on
9on outsourcing and provision of the public input good that will follow from the model set
out above. The government faces a general social welfare function12
1 1 2 2 1 1( , , ( ) )uW W n u n u n n u? ?            (9)
in which different welfare weights are attached to the utilities of different agent-types,
whereas identical individuals are subject to equal treatment.
The informational assumptions are conventional: the government knows the income
of each individual as well as the number of individuals of each ability-type, whereas ability
is private information. This means that the government is not able to observe whether any
given worker is a low-ability or high-ability type. By concentrating on the 'normal' case,
where redistribution means income transfers from the high-ability to the low-ability type,
one would like to prevent the high-ability type from mimicking the employed low-ability
type in order to gain from redistribution. The self-selection constraint that may bind then
becomes13
2 2 2 1 1 2ˆ( , ) ( , )u u c z u c H l u?? ? ? ?          (10)
where 2uˆ  denotes the utility of the mimicker and 1 2/ 1w w? ? ?  the wage ratio, i.e. the
before-tax wage rate of the low-ability type relative to the before-tax wage rate of the high-
ability type. Note also that the mimicker faces the same income and consumption point
and, therefore, pays as much tax as the employed low-ability type. However, as the
12  Another approach (which is common in earlier literature on the self-selection approach to optimal income
taxation) is to assume that the government aims at maximizing the utility of one agent-type subject to
minimum utility restrictions for the others. If we were to use this alternative approach (instead of using
the social welfare function discussed above), all qualitative results derived below would remain
unchanged. The only (technical) difference is that, if we were to maximize the utility of one of the agent-
types (say, the employed low-ability type) subject to minimum utility restrictions for the others (say, the
unemployed and the high-ability type), the private utility gain of increased employment would not appear
in the policy rules for optimal taxation and provision of the public input good (although the value of
increased employment would still be positive as in our model).
13  This formulation, which only applies when the mimicker is employed, was also used by Marceau and
Boadway (1994) in their study of minimum wage policy and unemployment insurance as means for
redistribution. It is based on the assumption that the utility facing an employed low-ability type always
exceeds the utility facing an unemployed individual. As a consequence, if the self-selection constraint in
(10) is binding, it follows that the utility of the high-ability type always exceeds the utility facing an
unemployed individual.
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mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type, he/she spends more time on leisure.
By using the first order conditions for the firm, one can see that ?  is a function of 2l , M ,
G  and 1minw , i.e.
2
1
2 1 min
min 1 1 2 2( , , , ) ( , , , )
L
wl M G w
F n l n l M G
? ?? ?          (11)
in which 1n  is determined by equation (8). With the assumptions made above, one can
show that an increase in the minimum wage reduces the wage inequality, i.e. 0/ 1min ?? w? ,
while an increase in the public input good increases the wage inequality, so / 0G?? ? ? .
The effects of the other variables can be either positive or negative in general. However, by
adding the assumption that the cross-derivative 1 2 ( ) 0L LF ? ?  is sufficiently small (which is
interpretable to mean that the degree of complementarity between the two ability-types is
only of limited importance for the wage distribution), then 2/ 0l?? ? ?  and / 0M?? ? ? ,
meaning that an increase in the hours of work by the high-ability type reduces the wage
inequality, whereas an increase in the resources spent on outsourcing leads to more wage
inequality.14 These properties appear to us to be reasonable and will be used in what
follows. The effect of 1l  on the wage ratio is zero, because the hours of work per employee
and the number of employed persons are perfect substitutes in terms of the production
function. We will return to this relationship below.
By using the short notation ( )i i iT T w l? , the budget constraint of the government is
given by
1 1 2 2 1 1( ) 0n T n T tM n n b G? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
where the production price of the public good (i.e. the marginal rate of transformation
between the public good and the private consumption good) has been normalized to one for
notational convenience. The term ?  represents possible pure profits, which we assume
accrue to the government, as the government is the owner of the factor treated as fixed by
14    This is in conformity with the empirical evidence mentioned earlier.
11
the firm. The component bnn )( 11 ?  represents the public expenditures on unemployment
benefits.
Note that ( )T ?  is a general income tax in the sense that it may be used to implement
any desired combination of 1l , 1c , 2l , and 2c . It is, therefore, convenient to follow earlier
comparable literature by using 1l , 1c , 2l , and 2c , instead of the parameters of ( )T ? , as
direct decision-variables for the government. Similarly, since the government can use t  to
exercise perfect control over M  (given that it also exercises control over 1l , 2l , G  and
1
minw ), we may also use M  as a direct decision-variable in what follows. By using the
private budget constraint and the objective function of the firm, we may rewrite the budget
constraint of the government to read as follows
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1( , , , ) ( ) ( ) 0uF n l n l M G n c n c n n c M G?? ? ? ? ? ? ? .          (12)
The government’s decision-problem will be to choose tax and expenditure policies in
order to maximize the social welfare function, presented in equation (9), subject to the self-
selection constraint and budget constraint given by equations (10) and (12), respectively, as
well as subject to equations (8) and (11), which determine the number of employed persons
of the low-ability type and the wage ratio, respectively. The Lagrangean corresponding to
the optimal tax and expenditure problem can now be written as
])()([]ˆ[ 11221122 GMcnncncnFuuWL u ?????????? ???
in which F  denotes the production function as specified in equation (12). The first order
conditions for the hours of work, consumption and outsourcing, which are the conditions
governing the optimal tax structure, are presented in the Appendix 1.
3.1.    Marginal income tax rates and the tax on outsourcing
We are now in the position to analyze how the simultaneous appearances of
equilibrium unemployment and outsourcing affect the optimal tax structure. The marginal
income tax rate of the low-ability type might be derived by combining equations (3), (A1)
and (A2), whereas the marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type is derived by
12
combining equations (3), (A3) and (A4). The tax rate on outsourcing can be derived by
combining equations (6) and (A5).  Now, let
,
i
i z
z c i
c
uMRS
u
?  and
2
2
, 2
ˆˆ
ˆ
z
z c
c
uMRS
u
denote the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption for
ability-type i and the mimicker, respectively. In addition, to shorten the notation, define the
value that the government attaches to the private utility gain of going from unemployment
to employment measured in terms of public funds
1
1 1 1 1
1
( ) (( ) )
u
u
W Wu u
n u n n u?
? ?? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
.
Then, by using * 2ˆ /cu? ? ?? , the marginal income tax rates and the tax on outsourcing can
be written as
* 1
' 1 1 1 2 1
, ,1 1 1 1 1
1ˆ( ) [ ] [ ]z c z c
nT w l MRS MRS T b
w n w n l
? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
?
         (13)
1
' 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
1ˆ( ) [ ]z
nT w l u l T b
w n l w n l
? ?
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
         (14)
1
2 1 1ˆ [ ]z
nt u l T b
M M
? ?
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ??
? ?
.          (15)
The main difference between, on the one hand, equations (13)-(15) and, on the other, the
corresponding results derived by Aronsson and Koskela (2008) for an economy with a
competitive labor market refers to the final term in each equation above, which appears
because each tax instrument can be used to influence the number of employed persons. To
sign this effect, we use the first order condition for the minimum wage
?
0][ˆ 1
min
1
11
1
min
2 ?
?
??????
?? ??
w
nbTl
w
uz ?
?? .          (16)
The left hand side of equation (16) is clearly positive, as an increase in the minimum wage
leads to an increase in the wage ratio (i.e. reduced wage inequality). Therefore, since an
13
increase in the minimum wage also contributes to reduce the number of employed persons,
i.e. 0/ 1min
1 ??? wn , we have 01 ???? bT .
We have derived the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the government can control outsourcing via a
direct tax instrument. With the assumptions made above, it follows that
(i)  the government implements a positive marginal income tax rate for the
low-ability type, a negative marginal income tax rate for the high-ability
type and a positive tax on outsourcing, and
(ii) the desire to increase employment provides an incentive for the
government (captured by the final term in each tax formula) to implement
a higher marginal income tax for the low-ability type, a lower marginal
income tax rate for the high-ability type and a higher tax on outsourcing,
ceteris paribus.
Proposition 1 follows by observing that 2,
1
,
ˆ
czcz SRMMRS ??  due to single crossing;
that 0/ 2 ??? l? , 0/ ??? M? , 1 1/ 0n l? ? ? , 1 2/ 0n l? ? ?  and 1 / 0n M? ? ?  by our earlier
assumptions; and that 01 ???? bT  according to equation (16). As a consequence, the
redistributive component (via the self-selection constraint) and corrective component (via
the employment effects) work in the same direction in each tax formula.
To be able to provide a more through interpretation of the second part of the
proposition, note that 1 0T b? ? ? ?  measures the social value of increased employment
among the low-skilled. As a consequence, there is an incentive for the government to use
tax policy to increase the number of employed persons captured by the final term on the
right hand side of each tax formula. The final term on the right hand side is positive in
equation (13), negative in equation (14) and positive in equation (15), respectively,
whereas each of these terms would have been equal to zero under full employment (where
11 nn ? ). The intuition is that a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the employed
low-ability type contributes to reduce the hours of work supplied by each employed low-
ability individual; a lower marginal labor income tax rate implemented for the high-ability
type leads to increased hours of work by the high-ability type; and a higher tax on
14
outsourcing leads to less outsourcing. Each such change leads to increased employment
among low-ability agents.15 However, note that the second part of the proposition does not
necessarily mean that the government implements a higher marginal income tax rate for
the low-ability type, a lower marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type and a higher
tax on outsourcing than it would have done in a competitive economy, since the effects of
public policy on the wage distribution are clearly different here than they would have been,
had the labor market been competitive.
It is interesting to compare the results on optimal income taxation with those derived
in earlier literature on optimal redistributive income taxation under imperfect competition
in the labor market. Equations (13) and (14) are similar to the policy rules for marginal
income taxation derived by Aronsson and Sjögren (2003) in an economy without
outsourcing, with the exception that union wage setting is the mechanism behind the
unemployment in their study. The main difference by comparison with their study is that
we are in this case able to sign the qualitative contribution to the marginal income tax rates
of the incentive to increase employment, i.e. we can sign the employment effects in the
expressions for the marginal income tax rates. In addition, and by comparison with
Aronsson and Koskela (2008) who consider outsourcing and optimal taxation in a
competitive economy, we are also able analyze and sign the qualitative contribution of the
employment-related motive for taxing outsourcing.
3.2.    Provision of the public input good
The first-order condition for the public input good can be written as
1
2 1 1ˆ( ) 1 [ ]G z
nf u l T b
G G
? ??
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ?
.          (17)
Equation (17) means that the optimal provision of the public good deviates from the first
best policy rule, i.e. ( ) 1 0Gf ? ? ? , because a change in the public input good directly affects
(i) the wage distribution and (ii) the number of employed persons. To be more specific,
15  It is also important to note that the increased marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type caused by
the employment effect in equation (13) would also follow under the weaker assumption that the hours of
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increased provision of the public input good reduces the wage ratio (i.e. leads to more
wage inequality), / 0G?? ? ? , and increases the number of employed persons of the low-
ability type, 0/1 ??? Gn . One can think of the first term on the right hand side of equation
(17) as capturing the redistributive motive for public provision, whereas the second term
captures the employment-related motive.
We summarize the main qualitative insight from equation (17) as follows.
Proposition 2. If the government can control outsourcing via a direct tax
instrument, it will underprovide (overprovide) the public input good relative
to the first best policy rule if the redistributive motive for public provision
dominates (is dominated by) the employment-related motive. The
employment-related motive contributes, unambiguously, to increase the
provision of the public input good.
The mechanisms behind Proposition 2 are that increased public provision has two
counteracting effects: it makes the income distribution more unequal (by increasing the
wage rate facing the high-ability type given the minimum wage rate facing the low-ability
type) and increases the employment. The relative strength of these two effects then
determines whether the optimal policy rule means overprovision or underprovision relative
to the first best policy rule.
4.     Optimal Taxation and Public Provision in Case (ii)
A possible objection to the analysis set out above is that international agreements
regarding factor mobility and trade may limit the possibility for national governments to
implement direct taxes on outsourcing. In this section, therefore, we analyze optimal
income taxation and provision of the public input good in Case (ii), where the government
lacks a direct instrument by which to tax outsourcing.
work per employee and the number of employed persons are imperfect substitutes in terms of the
production function.
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Note that the firm’s first order conditions for low-skilled labor and outsourcing,
respectively, now can be written as (with 0t ? )
1
1 1 2 2 1
min( , , , ) 0LF n l n l M G w? ?          (18)
1 1 2 2( , , , ) ( ) 0M MF n l n l M G M?? ? .          (19)
By solving equation system (18) and (19) for 1n  and M , we have (note that 1/ 0M l? ? ?
by the assumptions made earlier)
1 1 1 2 1
min( , , , )n n l l G w?          (20)
2 1
min( , , )M M l G w?          (21)
in which the constant 2n  has been suppressed. With the assumptions made in Section 2,
one can show that that an increase in the minimum wage leads to increased outsourcing,
while an increase in the public input good reduces outsourcing16, i.e. 1min/ 0M w? ? ?  and
/ 0M G? ? ? . An increase in the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type, on the
other hand, may either increase or decrease the amount of resources spent on outsourcing,
meaning that 2/M l? ?  can be either positive or negative. Note also that 1/ 0M l? ? ?  by the
assumptions made earlier, because the two effects via which the hours of work supplied by
the low-ability type affect outsourcing - a direct effect and an indirect effect via the
number of employed persons - cancel out. We will return to the properties of equation (21)
below.
The optimal tax and expenditure problem can be written as if the government
chooses 1l , 1c , 2l , 2c , G  and 1minw  to maximize the Lagrangean
])()([]ˆ[ 11221122 GMcnncncnFuuWL u ?????????? ???
16 The relationship between public infrastructure and outsourcing has also analyzed by Egger and Falkinger
(2006); yet in a context different from ours.
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subject to equations (8) and (21). The marginal income tax rates are derived by using
equations (A6)-(A9) in the Appendix 2. To analyze the optimal income tax structure, it is
useful to begin by discussing the first-order condition for the minimum wage, which can be
written as
1
2 1 1
1 1
min min
ˆ [ ] 0z
d dnu l T b
dw dw
?? ?? ? ? ? ? .          (22)
The derivatives of the wage ratio and the number of employed persons of the low-ability
type, respectively, with respect to the minimum wage in equation (22) can be decomposed
into two parts; a direct effect (with M  held constant) and an indirect effect via equation
(21). We have
0
1 1 1
min min min
0
M M
d M
dw w M w
? ? ?
?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
                                                                 (23)
0
1 1 1
1 1 1
min min min
0
M M
dn n n M
dw w M w
?
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
                                                                 (24)
where each direct effect is conditioned on the second best optimal level of outsourcing,
0M . Therefore, by the assumptions made above, the total effect on the number of
employed persons of an increase in the minimum wage is unambiguously negative,
whereas the total effect on the wage ratio wage can be either positive or negative. For
purposes of interpretation, let us add the assumption that the positive direct effect of the
minimum wage on the wage ratio dominates the negative indirect effect via the change in
outsourcing, so 1min/ 0d dw? ? . In this case, and by analogy to the analysis carried out in
the previous section, we can use equation (22) to show that 1 0T b? ? ? ? , which will be
useful below.
4.1.    Marginal income tax rates
As the social welfare function is equal to the Lagrangean at the second best optimum,
we can use [ / ] /L M ?? ? ?  to measure the welfare effect of a marginal increase in the
resources spent on outsourcing. The marginal income tax rates can then be written as
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* 1
' 1 1 1 2 1
, ,1 1 1 1 1
1ˆ( ) [ ] [ ]z c z c
M M
nT w l MRS MRS T b
w n w n l
? ?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
         (25)
0 0
1
' 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1ˆ( ) [ ]z
M M M M
n MT w l u l T b
w n l w n l w n l
? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
. (26)
Equation (25) means that the incentives underlying the marginal labor income tax rate
implemented for the low-ability type remain as in Case (i), were the government had
access to a direct instrument to tax outsourcing, whereas equation (26) contains an
additional incentive due the relationship between 2l  and M , which can be either positive
or negative. The intuition as to why a corresponding relationship between 1l  and M  is
absent in equation (25) was discussed in connection to equation (21) above: a change in the
hours of work per employed individual of the low-ability type will not affect the total
number of hours worked by the low-ability type, as the hours of work per employee and
the number of employed persons are perfect substitutes in terms of the production function.
To interpret the final term on the right hand of equation (26), we take the derivative of the
Lagrangean with respect to M  and use ( ) ( ) 0M MF ?? ? ? ?  from equation (19) to derive
? ? 0ˆ1
1
112 ?
?
?????
?
??
?
???
M
nbTl
M
u
M
L
z
?
?
?
?
.          (27)
We can then interpret equations (25) and (26) as follows.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the government does not have access to a direct
instrument to tax outsourcing. The incentives underlying the marginal labor
income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type remain as they were in
section 3 (i.e. where a direct tax on outsourcing was available). The
relationship between the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type and
the level of outsourcing provides an incentive for the government to increase
(decrease) the marginal labor income tax rate implemented for the high-
ability type – relative to the policy outcome that would be chosen with
0M M? - if 2/ 0M l? ? ?  ( 0? ).
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It is interesting to compare equations (25) and (26) with the corresponding marginal
income tax rates derived by Aronsson and Koskela (2008) in an economy with a
competitive labor market. They show that the lack of a direct tax instrument for
outsourcing provides an incentive for the government to implement a lower marginal
income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher marginal income tax rate for the high-
ability type than it would otherwise have done (i.e. if such an instrument were available).
With a binding minimum wage for the low-ability type, on the other hand, there is no
direct additional effect of outsourcing on the marginal labor income tax rate implemented
for the low-ability type, whereas the direct effect of outsourcing on the marginal income
tax rate implemented for the high-ability type can be either positive or negative, as the
effect of an increase in the hours of work by the high-ability type may either increase or
decrease the amount of resources spent on outsourcing. The intuition behind this ambiguity
is that an increase in the hours of work by the high-ability type will both have a direct
positive effect on outsourcing due to complementarity between high-skilled labor and
outsourcing and a negative effect due to complementarity between high-skilled hours of
work and the number of employed persons of the low-ability type. The latter relationship
would, of course, vanish under perfect competition.
4.2    Provision of the public input
Finally, turning to the provision of the public input good, we have
0 0
1
2 1 1ˆ( ) 1 [ ]G z
M M M M
n Mf u l T b
G G G
? ??
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ??
? ? ?
.                         (28)
The following result can be derived from equation (28);
Proposition 4. Without a direct instrument to tax outsourcing, there is an
incentive for the government to use the public input good to reduce the level
of outsourcing. This incentive effect – summarized by the third term on the
right hand side of equation (28) - works to increase the provision of the
public input good, ceteris paribus.
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Note that the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (28) are analogous to
the formula for public provision that applies when the government can tax outsourcing
directly, i.e. equation (17), with the exception that the derivatives of the wage ratio and the
number of employed persons, respectively, with respect to the public input good take other
forms here than in Section 3. The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straight forward: an
increase in G  contributes to reduce M  (as it leads to increased employment), which is
desirable by the results derived earlier.
5.     Summary and Discussion
Based on the argument that the combination of outsourcing and involuntary
unemployment may imply serious restraint on the opportunities available for the low-
skilled, this paper analyses redistributive nonlinear taxation and provision of a public input
good in an economy with equilibrium unemployment, where firms outsource part of their
production to other countries. Our study is based on an extension of the two-type optimal
income tax model here augmented with a minimum wage policy directed towards the low-
ability type (which, if binding, gives rise to equilibrium unemployment among the low-
skilled) as well as an option for the domestic firms to outsource part of the productive
resources. The policy instruments facing the government consists of a nonlinear income
tax, a public input good (which influences output as an externality production factor) as
well as a direct tax on the resources subject to outsourcing, where the latter instrument is
either operative, Case (i); or not operative, Case (ii).
In Case (i), where the direct tax on outsourcing is operative – and its level subject to
choice by the government – the presence of outsourcing does not modify the policy rules
for the marginal income tax rates and provision of the public input good. Instead, the
results show that the government may both relax the self-selection constraint and increase
employment among the low-skilled by implementing a positive marginal income tax rate
for the low-ability type and a negative marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type.
By a similar argument, the optimal tax on outsourcing is positive, since a lower level of
outsourcing implies less wage inequality (which contributes to relax the self-selection
constraint) and increased employment among the low-skilled. In other words, the
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appearance of equilibrium employment strengthens the argument for taxing low-ability
labor and subsidizing high-ability labor at the margin as well as strengthens the motive for
taxing outsourcing. For the public input good, however, the incentive to relax the self-
selection constraint and the incentive to increase employment affect the optimal policy in
opposite directions: the government will overprovide (underprovide) the public input good
relative to the first best policy rule if the incentive to increase employment among the low-
skilled dominates (is dominated by) the incentive to relax the self-selection constraint.
  In Case (ii), where the direct tax on outsourcing is not operative (and set equal to
zero), income taxation and public provision become indirect instruments for influencing
the amount of resources spent on outsourcing. According to our results, the appearance of
outsourcing will not directly affect the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-
ability type, while it may change the marginal income tax implemented for the high-ability
type in either direction, depending on whether an increase in the labor supply by the high-
ability type leads to more or less outsourcing. The qualitative contribution of the latter
mechanism is ambiguous in general, because high-ability labor is complementary both
with low-ability labor and outsourcing. On the other hand, the desire to reduce outsourcing
provides an unambiguous incentive to increase the provision of the public input good.
Future research might take several new possible directions, and we shall point out
two of them. First, we have completely neglected the role of capital income taxation and a
means to affect the resources spent on outsourcing. If domestic labor and capital are
complements in production – and as long as the government lacks a direct instrument for
controlling outsourcing – capital income taxation might be a useful tool to increase the
productivity of domestic labor and, therefore, influence the employment, wage inequality
and outsourcing simultaneously. Second, the resources that domestic firms spend on
outsourcing will give rise to welfare effects in other countries. This suggests that
uncoordinated policies might be inefficient from the perspective of society as a whole, and
that outsourcing provides an argument for policy coordination. We leave these and other
extensions for future research.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
The first order conditions governing the optimal tax structure in Section 3 are
1
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Appendix 2
The first order conditions governing the optimal tax structure in Section 4 can be written as
0 0
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